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Thatcherism and the origins of the 2007 Crisis  
The existing literature on and debates around the origins of the 2007 crisis broadly fit into 
three categories. The first views the crisis as an international crisis (French and Thrift, 2009), 
or at least ones whose roots can be traced or the USA (Duca et al, 2010), and one which 
policy makers in Britain only had a little or indirect effect upon. The second suggests the 
crisis evolved from the accession of New Labour (Goodhart, 2008; Hodson and Mabbett, 
2008) in particular Gordon Brown’s time as Chancellor, and the promising of the ending of 
boom and bust (Kavanagh and Cowley, 2010, 19-23). The third argument offers a slightly 
longer-term approach, whereby the financial crisis is seen as stemming from the ERM crisis 
of 1992 (Martin and Milas, 2013). In this article I content that the financial crisis has a longer 
history than either 1997 or 1992. In doing so I suggest that British policy makers were 
directly responsible for laying the foundations of the crisis in the 1980s – though the trigger 
event(s) can be linked to the role of investments in US sub-prime mortgages, the lack of 
liquidity within the UK banks in August 2007, or the ballooning of government debt 
following the bank bailouts/ nationalisations of 2007/8 depending upon the accepted 
definition/narrative of the crisis (Hay 2011, Blyth 2013). I do not contend that Thatcherism 
was responsible for these events, which occurred in the 2000s, but that the reforms of the 
Thatcher government set the political and economic scene in such a manner that once such 
problems emerged/ became prominent a crisis (however defined) was the logical conclusion 
of events. In this article I trace the foundations of the 2007 crisis back to the reforms of the 
1980s and suggest that the origins of the current crisis can be seen as stemming from the 
Thatcher government’s response to the previous crisis, that of the 1970s and early 1980s – a 
crisis in which the trade unions were heavily blamed for high inflation rates, high levels of 




light new questions emerge both from a historical perspective e.g. reassessing the legacy of 
Thatcher’s economic policy, and a policy making perspective e.g.  if the banking sector is left 
unreformed in the wake of the current crisis, one for which they have been heavily blamed, 
then can we expect a similar crisis in the not too distant future?  Alternatively can we speak 
of a sustainable crisis resolution before changes are made to the banking sector?  
Before I directly address the Thatcher government’s economic policies and record I wish to 
partly deconstruct the argument of those who support the view that the crisis is a global 
phenomenon. Whilst I do not disagree that the crisis has impacted many countries – though 
predominantly those classified as ‘westernised’ – this negates two important aspects; firstly 
that the position of Britain in the global economy was a product of specific economic policies 
such as the ‘Big Bang’ reforms of the 1980s and secondly that the position of Britain in the 
crisis was in some respects unique, and the pattern of economic ‘recovery’, has been different 
to the ‘recoveries’ in the Eurozone or the USA.    
The 2007 Crisis as a Crisis of Growth  
Following the 2007 crisis there has developed a number of competing rhetoric’s and 
narratives each which aim to define, understand and/or conceptualise the crisis. Hay (2011) 
highlights two distinct crises the first being the US subprime crisis and the second a crisis of 
British growth. Although the two are related they are not the same phenomenon as Hay 
(2011, 14) notes;  
‘Though it is tempting to see the UK’s longest and deepest recession since the 1930s 
as a product of contagion – the consequence of financial interdependence more than 
anything … is both profoundly wrong and profoundly dangerous. It is wrong because 
this is just as much a crisis (if crisis it is at all) of the Anglo-liberal growth model as it 
is a specifically American crisis; it is dangerous because it may lead us to overlook 






In another article Hay (2013, 24) also distinguishes between a ‘debt crisis’ and a ‘growth 
crisis’ arguing that although the former has become the dominant discourse promoted by 
elites (politicians and the media) it is in fact a second order crisis which stems from the 
growth crisis. Hay further argues that blame attribution alongside political considerations has 
led to a misdiagnosis, whereby the crisis of growth has been mislabelled a crisis of debt.   
Krippner (2011) in exploring the crisis in the United States notes that the crisis stemmed from 
policymakers actions in the 1970s. Tracing the American economy from the 1970s and 1980s 
into the 2000s she argues that the problems of the crisis stemmed from a financialisation of 
the economy. Defining the ‘central thesis’ of her argument she notes, 
‘the turn to finance allowed the state to avoid a series of economic, social and political 
dilemmas that confronted policy makers … paradoxically preparing the ground for 
our own era of financial manias, panics and crashes some three decades later.’ 
(Krippner 2011, 2) 
 
According to Krippner the problems were exaggerated not only through this shift in the 
balance of the economy but though a belief that financial markets were, and could be, 
efficient.  Such a philosophy can be said to have occurred in Britain. Important within this 
shift was a belief in the virtues of the free market and neoliberal ideologies. Crouch (2009, 
388) points to notions of ‘privatised Keynesianism’ which developed out of the inflationary 
pressure felt by states in the 1970s.  The privatised Keynesianism was based upon an 
increasingly extended investment chains and the opening up of these trade chains to riskier 
trades and traders. According to Crouch (2011, 99) ‘banks constructed bundles of very varied 
risk, in which quite safe loans were mixed up with unsecured mortgages in unspecified 
proportions’. This is linked to the short-termism of investors buying such bundles of risk, 
Crouch continues ‘but the traders buying them showed no interest in examining the bundles, 




almost infinite regress that was setting prices in the secondary markets.’ This form of 
privatised Keynesianism was based upon the confidence of markets to preform efficiently, 
and a  mood of ‘excessive optimism’ on the part of traders, ‘a confidence proved to be 
justified – that governments would not let the system fail and would therefore move in to 
compensate them for any loses they made through excessive trading’ (Crouch, 2011, 101). 
This system prioritised the role of capital over labour within the economy; it emphasized the 
role of the market and the traders working within such a framework.  
Whilst it would be wrong to suggest that such changes caused a the crisis, it would be equally 
misinformed to suggest that the blame lies solely in the global financial system or the culprits 
for the crisis lay in the USA when the crisis has trajectories unique to Britain. I argue that in 
order to fully understand the crisis of 2007 the unique positioning of Britain’s economy in 
2007 – something that directly stems from the macroeconomic policies of the 1980s and 
1990s – must also be explored and understood. Here I wish to explore the nature of the 
British crisis – the crisis in the British growth model. In doing so I follow Hay’s (2011, 2013) 
assertion and argue that this – rather than systemic problems of debts - is the most pressing 
crisis facing Britain. Although this crisis came to prominence in 2008 (as a result of changes 
which affect Britain but also most of the westernised world) I argue that this crisis has deeper 
foundations, and that these foundations were laid by the politics of the Thatcher governments 
in their responses to the Keynesians crisis of the 1970s.   
In this article I demonstrate how events and policies which changed the political economy in 
the 1980s can be seen as laying the foundations for the current crisis. Policies such as the 
‘Right to Buy’ scheme and the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the financial sector, whilst 
distinctive in their own right, are important in assessing these shifts in policymaking. Both 
generated growing inequalities, helped prioritise capital and the owners of capital over labour 




Further, by assessing these policies and drawing parallels with policies aimed at promoting 
Britain’s recovery from the financial crisis I ask, ‘are we simply repeating the mistakes of the 
past?’ and ‘how new or novel are the proposed means of recovering from the crisis?’ The 
answers to these questions link into wider debates surrounding the sustainability of present 
policies aimed at generating an economic recovery.  
 
Thatcher and the ‘Crisis Resolution’ of the 1980s  
Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party won the 1979 general election amidst 
perceptions of mounting industrial unrest, excessive union militancy and power and an 
‘oversized’ state (King, 1975). British economic growth in the 1970s was beset by the 
problem of stagflation – a problem with roots in the 1960s - and talk of a ‘British economic 
decline’ was rife (Artis and Cobham, 1991; Will, 2009).  Equally the trade unions were 
perceived and portrayed as being overtly political in their actions and a threat to wider 
democratic principles. Two elections, February 1974 and 1979, it was argued, were lost by 
incumbent governments due to excessive or unnecessary industrial unrest (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1980; Gilmour, 1992, 76-77). Such problems formed the basis for the construction 
of a crisis narrative, and enabled politicians and the media to blame the trade unions and 
pursue an anti-union agenda (Hay, 1996; Sandbrook, 2010).  
Thatcherism was, I content, a set of deliberate policies aimed at weakening the power of 
labour in the production process. Thatcher used and amended the narratives of crisis which 
emerged in the 1970s to promote the role of capital over labour in the economy. Thatcher 
herself was heavily involved in this process, and stressed the importance of reigning in trade 
union powers (The Sun, 11.1.79, 2; Dorey, 1995). In 1982, Ferdinand Mount, one of 




envisioned a trade union movement ‘much reduced in size’ (Duffin, 2013). Over the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s ‘the core institutions of collective regulation were systematically 
dismantled’ (Howell, 2007,164).       
The weakening of the trade union movement was central to Thatcher’s macroeconomic 
policy objectives; the rebalancing of the economy and the shift away from Keynesianism 
towards monetarism and shifting attention from unemployment to inflation statistics. If trade 
union powers could be reduced, so the narrative went, then economic factors such as 
unemployment would become increasingly less significant and could be replaced as key 
indicators by measurements such as inflation. 
Here I do not wish to surround myself with debates about the 1970s. Instead I suggest that the 
rhetoric and policies of the Thatcher government weakened labour and promoted the role and 
importance of capital in the economy policies which although successful in creating 
economic growth in the short term generated a very unsustainable economy and laid the 
foundations for the crisis of 2007. In doing so I shall explore two particular policies of the 
Thatcher government; the ‘Right to Buy’ scheme and the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the 
financial industry in 1986.  
‘Right to Buy’ scheme (Housing Act 1980) and The Creation of a Housing Bubble 
Housing policy was central to Thatcher’s electoral success in 1979 and 1983. The 
Conservatives were able to offer new and pragmatic policies, based around twin goals of 
‘reducing public expenditure and encouraging growth in home ownership’. The central pillar 
of this strategy was the selling off of Britain’s housing stock through the ‘Right to Buy’ 
scheme (Monk and Kleinamn, 1990, 121).   
The ‘Right to Buy’ scheme was introduced in 1980. It gave those living in social housing the 




and 60 per cent and has continued post-Thatcher (albeit with reduced financial incentives 
offered to tenants) (Garrett, 1994, 110; Jones and Murie, 2006). The scheme was further 
extended through the 1984 Housing act which shortened the period of occupancy before a 
tenant could buy their house and increased the maximum discount offered by councils. 
Between 1980 and 1987 over a million homes – ‘6 per cent of Britain’s housing stock’ - were 
sold (Norris, 1990, 68).  
Over 1.3 million people brought their homes under the scheme between 1980 and 1990, and a 
further 2.5 million between 1990 and 2009 (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011, 122). This combined 
with restrictions on ‘local authority use of their capital receipts to build new houses, in 
combination with the operation of the [right to buy] ...  resulted in a substantial reduction in, 
and a residualisation of local authority housing available for rent’ led to significant increases 
in house prices (Ford and Burrows, 1999, 307) as demand for housing (especially in the more 
prosperous south east and London regions) outstripped supply.  
 
Such rises in house prices resulted in the unequal growth of property ownership. In 1988  
‘58 percent of young people in the low-to-middle income group owned a home and 14 
percent rented privately. By 2008, those figures had flipped to 29 percent [owning] 
and 41 percent [renting privately]. This change took place in spite of a dramatic 
loosening of credit.’ (Plunkett, 2011, 11)  
 
Changes to council, or public, housing impacted upon the private rental sector, and promoted 
inequalities in society. During the 1980s the groups of people renting was largely confined to 
‘low income, non-family households in furnished ready-access accommodation and mainly 
elderly households in unfurnished accommodation, where long-term tenancies were 
concentrated.’ The tax system further discouraged people who could afford to buy from 





The extension of home ownership presented some people with assets which, if refinanced, 
could provide an alternative from of income. This is important for those who experienced an 
‘income shock’, for example those made unemployed and have little or no other liquid assets 
to sustain themselves with (Hurst and Stafford, 2004). However those who suffered an 
‘income shock’ were not the only ones who could refinance, houses could be used to obtain 
credit which in turn could be used to finance consumption. As figure 1 demonstrates the 
amount of money taken from houses and used for consumption and investment rose during 
1980s and, despite a fall in the early 1990s, the upward trend continued from 1995. By 2007 
the figure was significantly higher than 1980. The number of new mortgages issued further 
experienced two boom periods; the first in 1981-1987 and the second 1995-2003. At its peak 
in 2004 the number of new mortgages issued (140,000) was double the 1979 figure (Barrow, 
2012). In addition to this the value of these new mortgages grew at a faster rate than wages, 
again increasing exposure to debt. As Ambrose (2012, original emphasis) notes;  
 
‘Had the volume of mortgage lending moved up from 1980 in line with earnings, and 
had these practices not been adopted, total outstanding mortgage debt would have 
been about £200bn by 2007. In fact it was over £1,000bn – i.e. £1trillion.The 
enormous sum of about £800bn had been invested, or one would argue miss-
invested, over this period in stimulating house prices.’ 
 
[Figure 1 about here, Housing equity withdrawl as a proportion of post-tax income Source (Office for National 
Statistics, 2009, 88)] 
Along with the extension of credit cards and other loans (both secured and unsecured) the rise 
in mortgages (and the value of mortgages) outstripped rises in wages. Britons (and the wider 
economy) became increasingly reliant upon debt. Despite a 330 per cent rise in household 
income the proportion of ‘total household disposable income was relatively steady over the 




in line with household income. This implies that the rise in household income is being used to 
fuel consumption rather than saving.   
[Figure 2, about here Household debt as a proportion of household income. 1 Includes secured and unsecured debt. 
Source (Office for National Statistics, 2009) ] 
While some view Britain’s consumer society as a long term phenomena (Hilton, 2003)  - a 
point I do not reject – I maintain that the 1980s saw a distinct shift in this consumer nature as 
profits gained from house price fluctuations could be used to fuel consumers demand. Fig 1 
demonstrated two clear periods of increasingly equity withdrawal, one from the mid1990s 
through into the early 2000s, but also one previously between 1980 and 1987. This 
demonstrates a longer term trend towards house prices (and perceptions of future price 
changes. Although the effects of the mid-1980s borrowing were relatively short-lived 
(certainly compared to the increases from 1995), house prices (and house price rises) gained 
an increasing significance in the wider economy and were now linked to credit, debt and 
consumption.      
 
The housing bubble crash in the early 1990s did not signal an end to the Thatcherite 
consensus on home ownership or mortgages. The Right to Buy scheme was amended five 
times between 1990 and 2004 (Jones and Murie, 2006, 38) helping fuel another housing 
bubble, between the mid1990s and 2006. House prices, aided by historically low rates of 
inflation, outstripped inflation (Nationwide, 2013), (see Fig 3). This increased levels of 
mortgage debt, whilst simultaneously increasing people’s dependency upon high houses 
prices as property was their main source of wealth.  
Changes in house prices were facilitated by declining interest rates (as interest rates represent 
the cost of borrowing money and the relative ease at which people can obtain and repay 




started in the 1980s, following a short reversal, were exaggerated in the 2000s. Interest rates 
peaked at 17 per cent in November 1979, before steadily falling to 8.8 per cent in 1988. 
Despite increasing again before the end of the decade the long-term trend was downwards 
and by the mid-2000s (February 2003 – November 2006) they averaged just over 4.3 per 
cent. (Bank of England, 2013), see Fig 3. These historically low interest rates along with 
increased consumerism encouraged and enabled house owners to re-mortgage their properties 
and release money from their homes.  
Figure 3 about here Interest Rates 1979-2009. Data source (Bank of England, 2013) 
This rise in credit was further exaggerated by new entrants in the credit market. Throughout 
the 1980s credit became available to a wider variety of people, in particular those on lower 
incomes. This in part occurred due to the cheapening of credit (Aoki et al, 2002; fig 3). 
Buoyed by rising housing prices, people were able, and encouraged, to borrow more, as the 
value of people’s assets were continually increasing albeit at an unequal rate. Increases in 
housing wealth ‘contributed significantly to the consumer boom of the 1980s’ (Attanasio and 
Weber, 1994; Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997, p. 1701; see also fig 1 and fig 4). Money 
‘released’ from housing or house price increases could further be invested, speculatively, 
either in property or the increasingly deregulated stock market. Notions of making ‘a quick 
buck’ were facilitated by the expansion of credit. Such opportunities were popularised in film 
– Gordon Gekko in the 1987 film Wall Street famously said ‘Greed – for lack of a better 
word – is good. Greed is right. Greed works’. Speaking following the dot.com bubble burst in 
2001 Alan Greenspan (Quoted by, Folbre, 2009, 1-2) spoke of ‘“an infectious greed” within 
the business community. It is not, he explained, “that humans have become any more greedy 
than in generations past. It is that the avenues to express greed had grown enormously”.’  
[Figure 4 About here. Wealth of a selection of the British public 1970-1989. Data from (Alvaredo et al, 2013). *Data 




The expansion of credit was not equal, for those on middle-to-low incomes the burden of 
mortgage repayments rose rather than fell during this period (Plunkett, 2011, 11). However 
there was a greater willingness, from within the banking sector, to help fund house purchases 
particularly at the ‘bottom end of the market’ (Boddy, 1989, 94), thus exposing banks and 
later building societies to risker assets.  
Such linkages were sustainable only in so far as house prices continued to increase. If house 
prices fell (as they did post 2007) people would quickly find themselves unable to repay their 
debt. Mortgage indebtedness was such that by the timing of the 1992 election, following an 
economic downturn, many new property owners in the Southeast were left in a ‘housing trap 
where the size of their mortgages was greater than the value of their homes. [Although] the 
incentives for people to sell their homes had increased, their ability to do so decreased.’ 
(Garrett, 1994,  108)   
Thatcher’s reforms to the housing market, along with changes in the interest rates (which 
were set by governments until 1997), artificially inflated house prices. Those that did own 
their own home were able to use it as an asset, in a deregulated credit market, to fuel 
consumption. House prices rose steadily in the 1980s, though were increasingly connected to 
the debt and consumer bubble, once house prices begin to fall wider economic problems were 
likely to occur.   
‘Big Bang’ deregulation   
The Thatcher government was committed to deregulating the financial services industry and 
promote both competition within a deregulate economy and London’s position as a ‘major 
world financial centre’ (Boddy, 1989, 92). In 1979 the incoming Thatcher government lifted 
exchange controls, meaning British firms could buy foreign securities (Poser, 1988, 320). The 




demonstrated in 1980 when the government removed the ‘corset’ – ‘a devise by which the 
Bank of England imposed limits on bank lending.’ In 1986 the Stock Exchange was excluded 
from the ‘operation of the Restrictive Trade Practises Act’ (Thatcher, 1993, 125, 311). 
Deregulation further increased the capacity of new financial service providers to enter 
markets such as the mortgages market, and in doing so gave these institutions greater powers 
to set their own commercial interest rates (Boddy, 1989, 94-95). Such policies promoted the 
role of capital and granted increased powers to capital (vis-à-vis labour) in the economy. 
The notion of a ‘Big Bang’ emerged following the passage of two pieces of legislation; the 
Financial Services Act and the Building Societies Act in 1986 (Barnard, 1987). This ‘Big 
Bang’ was described by Galletly and Ritchie (1986, 12) as ‘a revolution ... daily procedures 
which have lasted for two generations are being swept away almost overnight.’ The date of 
this ‘revolution’ was the 27 October 1986. It was part of the process of creating ‘popular 
capitalism’, what Norris (1990, 64) describes as ‘a new share-owning, property-owning, self-
reliant Conservative working class’, further aided by the large scale-privatisation projects of 
Thatcher second term (Young, 1990, 498-499). 
 
The ‘Big Bang’ became synonymous with deregulation, and the deregulation of the British 
financial sector. Poser (1988, 319) identifies four key components of the ‘Big Bang’;  
(1) The abolition of fixed commission rates charged by members to their customers, 
and their replacement by negotiated rates; 
(2) The elimination of the ‘single capacity’ system, which prevented stock exchange 
members from acting both as brokers – i.e. agents – for customers and dealers – 
i.e. principals - for their own accounts. 
(3) The introduction of a new system for trading securities on the stock exchange;   
(4) The lifting of restrictions on exchange membership, which enable major British 






The Building Societies Act ‘ease[d] restrictions on building societies in terms of use of funds, 
allowing for unsecured loans and finance for land and property development’ (Boddy, 1989,  
93). This was important as it changed the nature of, and institutions involved in, the mortgage 
market. Previously building societies were the major funders of loans for house purchases. 
Under the new act however institutions were able to diversify their portfolio this enabled 
building societies to hold risker assets (Boddy, 1989, 100). This in turn made the investments 
of building societies (and later banks) riskier. Banks seeking increased profit margins 
increased their operations and offered mortgages to new and riskier entrants into the housing 
markets for the first time. This increased their exposure to the risks of mortgage defaults. 
The ‘Big Bang’ had three key economic implications; firstly it signified and entrenched the 
importance of the City of London in Britain’s economy, secondly it offered large 
deregulation of the banking sector increasing its exposure to risk, and third it helped integrate 
Britain’s economy into the neoliberal global order.  
The City of London and its success was crucial for the Thatcher government that sought to 
privatise industries and shift the focus of the economy away from labour in favour of capital. 
Thatcher, speaking at the Lord Mayor’s banquet in 1981 defined the City of London as ‘a 
precious national asset [and warned that any] government that fails to recognise this fails to 
understand our national interest’ (Green, 2004, 172). Throughout the Thatcher governments 
the centrality of the City of London became evident. Economic changes meant that traditional 
staple industries were declining in importance and increasingly Britain and her policy makers 
became increasingly dependent upon the City of London and finance to maintain national 
income and tax receipts. Britain’s economic fortunes for the first time became linked with 
non-tangible goods, and facilitated the rise of the service sector. This led to a widely 
imbalanced economy with an over-reliance upon one geographical region and a particular 




and Leyshon, 1992,  290). As Fig 5 demonstrates the gross value per head in London rose 
dramatically over the period 1997-2013, and has even increased to record levels since the 
onset of the financial crisis. As one (albeit London) newspaper suggested ‘London has never 
been this important to the UK economy’ (Heath, 2013).  
 
[Figure 5 about here Gross Value Added Per Head, London 1997-2013 Data Source (Office for National Statistics , 
2011) ] 
Legislative changes further helped generate notions and realisations of ‘international’ 
financial markets. Following the ‘Big Bang’ and loosening of restrictions on capital transfers, 
Britain became more intertwined in the global economy. This was part of the drive towards 
competitiveness the Thatcher governments pursued. In practice this meant an acceptance of a 
neo-liberal world order and moving away from the tripartite or corporatist state of the post 
war period – a move made easier by the high profile defeats of the trade union movement in 
Britain and elsewhere in Europe (Overbeek, 1993, 16-17). The ‘Big Bang’ positioned the 
City of London, and by extension the whole of the UK economy, firmly in the neo-liberal 
world economy. Along with a move towards internationalisation, the ‘Big Bang’ formed part 
of the government’s policies of deregulating and increased competition in the banking 
industry (Ennew, et al., 1990, 80). The acts were ‘crucial’ in allowing the ‘city to adapt to the 
highly competitive international markets’ which it operated in (Thatcher, 1993, 311-312). 
This along with greater interconnectedness made Britain more susceptible to a global 
economic downturn.  
The Big Bang further aided the stock market, which was becoming central to Britain’s 
economic fortunes. Already buoyed by newly privatised industries which were being sold by 
government at a discounted rate 
‘the abolition of minimum commissions changed the economics of brokerage and 
market-making, making joint-provision of these functions and foreign entry 




marked rise in the number of individual members of the Stock Exchange.’ (Bank of 
England, 2010) 
 
This further helped increase the performance of the stock market on a short term basis. The 
‘Big Bang’ ‘was assisted by and in turn further stimulated the booming bull market’. The 
number of equity market-makers (previously ‘dealers’) increased from 13 in 1986 to 34 just a 
year later (Davis, 1996, 433). 
Such deregulation and increased competition led to banks becoming  
‘more aggressive in the marketing and positioning of their off-balance sheet products 
and services. Many banks entered the securities business by acquiring stock broking 
and jobbing firms. Non-banking financial institutions, such as insurers, retailers and 
building societies, challenged the banks on their traditional balance sheet activity’ 
(Matthews et al, 2007)  
and, thus, increasing their exposure to risk - one key problem of the recent financial crisis. 
Banks and building societies, far from being passive in such regulations were   
‘active participants, encouraged by the UK’s lax national financial regulatory regime, 
its low interest rates, and an insatiable quest on the part of the banks and demutualised 
building societies to become global players, to borrow in global money markets in 
order to create ever larger volumes of profitable mortgage lending.’ (The Smith 
Institute, 2009) 
 Impact of Thatcher’s ‘Resolution’: The Crisis of 2007 
Thatcherism sought to fundamentally alter the nature of the British economy. The economy 
during the 1980s was reconfigured; weakening the power(s) of labour and enhancing the 
power(s) (and owners) of capital. Gamble (2009, 161) notes ‘the financial growth model 
which underpinned the recovery from the 1970s stagflation depended on giving maximum 
freedom to finance to drive the pursuit if profit in all sectors of the economy.’ 
Such reforms led to further problems in the economy. Underlying problems developed out of 




Thatcher was undoubtedly successful in weakening the powers of labour, and especially the 
trade unions in the 1980s whilst increasingly the powers of capital (and the owners of 
capital). Capital gained power relative to labour, and the British growth model became reliant 
upon non-tangible goods, such as financial products. The sale of council houses helped create 
and inflate a housing bubble, which, alongside an easing of credit restrictions (e.g. lower 
interest rates) and a greater willingness from consumers to use credit as a means of sustaining 
consumption led to a highly volatile market.        
Much of the rise in share and home ownership was fuelled by short term debt and often 
borrowed against the assets being purchased (e.g. against the home in the case of mortgages). 
This proved problematic as this debt binge inflated both stock and housing prices ‘far beyond 
their long term sustainable levels, and [made] banks seem more stable and profitable than the 
really [were]’ (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009, xxv). Debt was used to purchase – and secured 
upon – an asset whose price had been inflated. This had cyclical connotations, as rises in 
house prices and stock market prices led to an increase in expectations, which in turned 
enabled a boom in consumer spending, as money could be increasingly obtained from asset 
purchases such as houses, or (expected) price rises (Allen and Gale 1999, 13).  
The process of, and drive towards, consumerism is important. Advocates of consumerism 
claimed it legitimised capitalism and the Thatcher governments’ wider political programme. 
The rise in consumption can also be linked to the rise in debt, as consumption became 
increasingly financed by debt. Debt could be obtained based upon future predictions of 
economic income/prosperity. Equity withdrawal rose, on the back of rising house prices, and 
fuelled by short term bubbles and governmental policy, expectations of future economic 
successes became increasingly optimistic  (Peachy, 2013; see also fig 1). From 1980 to 1989 
house prices rose at an annual average rate of over 12 per cent (see fig 6). Fig 6 demonstrates 




Thatcherite policy of right to buy, and a second from 1996. Credit became easier to obtain on 
the back of rising asset prices, and credit cards and loans became accessible to a greater 
proportion of the population. Importantly this credit was obtained based upon future 
projections, rather than guaranteed income - if the prices of house fell, leaving people with 
‘negative equity’, they would struggle to repay their loans (as was the case in many US-
subprime mortgages in the 2000s).    
[Figure 6 about here Average House Prices 1= nominal house prices, not seasonally adjusted. 2= House prices 
adjusted for inflation (RPI) Data Source Nationwide 2013) 
Equally the institutions offering credit were less insulated than they once were; banks and 
building societies became more interconnected to the wider economy, and financial services 
were increasingly connected to house prices and stock market variations. At the same time as 
the British economy was becoming increasingly reliant upon banks and financial institutions 
these institutions themselves were issuing and exposing themselves to riskier loans and debts. 
Furthermore changes both in Britain and abroad made the financial markets more susceptible 
to global pressures and shocks, which would inevitably be passed on to consumers of credit.  
The interconnectedness of the financial sector and its weakness is possibly best demonstrated 
in the case of Northern Rock. Northern Rock became a victim of the crisis not due to its 
lending practises but due to the interconnectedness of the globalised economy, and the 
decisions of other banks. A rise in the LIBOR rate, in early September, along with an 
announcement, 13th September 2007, that Northern Rock sought (and received) emergency 
funding from the Bank of England led to the first run on a British bank for 150 years (BBC 
News, 2008). The problem faced by Northern Rock was of increases in interest rates, which 
occurred due to the actions of other financial institutions, and meant that Northern Rock was 
no longer able to rely upon the short term loans market to ‘roll over’ or renew its debt (as this 




Banking reforms had lead Britain during the period 1980-2007 to became increasingly 
globalised (Miles, 2006). Such changes were not natural or predetermined shifts, but 
represented clear policy goals of the Thatcher –and later New Labour– administrations. In 
particular the economies of Britain and the United States became increasingly connected. A 
number of US financial firms (Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse and 
First Boston) took advantage of the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation to establish themselves in 
London. This linked the fortunes of the British and American markets. Such was the foreign 
investment that by the turn of the century London had become ‘dominated by overseas 
institutions’ (Hamnett, 2003, 36). This interconnectedness ensured that British banks were no 
longer susceptible to risks within the domestic economy but were now exposed to the risks 
taken by American banks too. Eichengreen et al. (2012) demonstrate how banks became 
interconnected prior to 2007. The interconnectedness of banks was not a product of the crisis 
– be it a global crisis or a British one – but stemmed from the policies of American but also 
British policy makers in the 1980s. Both the Thatcher and Regan administrations committed 
themselves to global neo-liberalism and pursed the creation of a new growth model away 
from the Keynesianism one that was established after the Second World War (King and 
Wood, 1999). 
These policies stemmed from the narrative and responses of the Thatcher government to the 
trade union crisis in the 1970s. The ‘Thatcher revolution’ and its subsequence acceptance in a 
post-Thatcherite settlement further fuelled a debt crisis, raised house prices, generated and 
extended inequalities in society, helped inflate a stock market bubble, promoted what Susan 
Strange (1997) labels ‘casino capitalism’ and  led to an increased dependence upon banks. 
Banks became increasingly interdependent, but also risker as they were now dependent upon 
a wider range of creditors, including those less likely to be able to repay loans (Thrift and 




were linked to the stock exchange and pensions to international financial transactions. In turn 
this meant an increased reliance upon banks and the stock market and helped to generate 
notions of ‘too big to fail’ which would come to characterise the state’s involvement in the 
crisis in 2007.  
Crisis Management in the wake of the 2007 Crisis: Repeating the Mistakes 
of the Past?  
The previous section has demonstrated how the Thatcherite reforms paved the way for the 
crisis of 2007. Many other authors (see for exmaple Gamble, 2009; Hay, 2011; Blyth, 2013) 
have debated the effects of the crisis, and I do not wish to repeat these arguments here. 
Instead I wish to; using the evidence presented above, ask how likely a sustainable recovery 
given current government economic policy or if such policies are simply repeating the 
mistakes of the past.      
The fall in house prices since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 has left many people 
facing the problem of negative equity. Akin to this is the growing number of people unable to 
afford to join the lowest rungs of the property market or save enough to put down a deposit 
on a house. In order to try and overcome the latter of these problems the government has 
introduced a new help to buy scheme, easing the flow of credit. Furthermore despite levelling 
blame at the banking sector the government (along with its New Labour predecessor) has 
failed to move away from the existing growth model or economic paradigm. The model of 
banking which became prevalent in the 1980s (especially after the reforms of 1986) has been 
largely defended.  These two policies appear extremely reminiscent of the 1980s and need to 
be examined in order to ascertain how sustainable the post financial crisis recovery/ new 




Despite the banking sector initially being blamed for the financial crisis, the problem has 
since been rebranded as a national debt by politicians pursuing austerity policies. In this 
discourse the City of London’s political and economic importance is demonstrated as far 
from being ‘reformed’ or marginalised, it has been incorporated into debates surrounding 
Britain’s economic recovery (Sibun, 2010; BBC News, 2011). The regulatory structures of 
the banking system have been largely maintained throughout the crisis. The financial system 
– what Hay (2011) defines as the Anglo-American growth model - has not undergone 
widespread structural change. Since the 1980s the banking sector has become important not 
only with the British economy but also within the political sphere  (Hindmoor & McConnell, 
2013, p. 553). Linked to this is the narrative of ‘too big to fail’ which was used to defend the 
bailouts of banks and financial institutions. This narrative argued that if no government 
support came forward Britain would face widespread economic problems which would 
ultimately be more costly than bailing out the institutions in the first instance.  
The problem of this logic was noted by Mervyn King, who in 2009 (Quoted by Goldstein and 
Véron, 2011) said that ‘if some banks are thought to be too big to fail, then … they are too 
big…. Privately owned and managed institutions that are too big to fail sit oddly with a 
market economy.’ However such lessons may not have been headed by policymakers. As 
Crouch (2011) notes politicians see the rebuilding of the deregulated model as advantageous. 
Crouch (2011:123) asks; ‘how long can one expect the boundaries erected between safe mass 
banks and risky investment banks to last, when those boundaries are preventing bankers and 
politicians from reaping the benefits they came to understand in the 1990s and 2000s?’ 
Furthermore in the wake of an EU challenge the coalition government has sought to defend 
bankers bonuses – despite such bonuses as being increasingly scrutinised, and blamed for the 
recklessness they encouraged following the bailouts of 2007/8 payments (Jones & 





Similar parallels can be drawing in the housing market, following the government’s Help to 
Buy Scheme warnings have come from both economists and politicians alike (BBC News, 
2013b). According to the ONS house prices in August 2013 reached their highest level, 
‘surpass[ing] its previous peak in January 2008 (185.5) by 0.3per cent’ (Office for National 
Statistics, 2013). House prices rose 7.7 per cent year on year in November 2013, and 11.7% 
by the same measure in July 2014. This growth however has been unequal with most of the 
price increases coming in London and the South East. The growth rate in London as of July 
2014 was 19.1% four times that of Northern Ireland (4.5%) and almost four times that of 
Yorkshire and the Humber (5%). There have also been concerns of an overheating housing 
market the Bank of England is ‘refocusing the Funding for Lending scheme (FLS) on 
business, not mortgage borrowers’ (BBC News, 2013c, 2014). As in the 1980s housing 
reforms stem from a primarily conservative desire for private property ownership and the 
extension of property rights, adopted by the coalition government.   
 
In both cases (housing and bank regulation) the government’s plans may, as in the 1980s, 
create a largely unsustainable bubble in house (or asset) prices whilst further encouraging a 
consumer bubble build upon debt and (optimistic) future predictions of price increases. To do 
so would be to repeat the mistakes of the 1980s, risking further economic problems, and to 
ignore the lessons of the recent financial crisis. In short, to achieve a sustainable recovery a 
differential approach, what others have labelled a ‘new paradigm’ (Hodson and Mabbett, 





The Thatcherite reforms whilst ‘alleviating’ the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s paved the way 
for a new crisis. The reforms increased the power of capital (or the owners of capital) over 
labour. Capital, banks and the wider financial sector became increasingly deregulated and the 
government undertook a deliberate policy to weaken labour’s ability to cause, or generate, a 
crisis akin to the one for which they were blamed in the 1970s. Building societies and banks 
took on increasingly riskier assets, helped facilitate an expansion of the mortgage market and 
became increasingly interconnected. Both house and share prices ballooned, aided by an 
expansion of credit to fuel speculative bubbles and historically low interest rates. 
Such changes failed to prevent future crises from occurring, and in many ways the Thatcher 
reforms laid the foundations for the next crisis, that of 2007. The visible effects of the 1980s 
may only have occurred, on a macroeconomic scale, in 2007 but the seeds were laid much 
earlier. The relationship between capital and labour, and the desire of the Thatcher 
governments (and their successors) to promote capital is pivotal to understanding the crisis 
that unfolded in the late 2000s. Whilst it may be argued such changes were unforeseen, or 
accidental, the policies and the policy drives implemented by the Thatcher governments 
represented a clear determination to alter the labour/capital relationship in Britain and are 
important in relation to the crisis of 2007.   
I have demonstrated how the financial crisis of 2007 has its foundations in the 1980s. By 
examining two specific policies, the ‘Right to Buy’ housing scheme and the ‘Big Bang’ 
deregulation of the financial services industry I have traced significant changes in recent 
British economic history and demonstrated that the continued acceptance of the Thatcherite 




changes I contend should be viewed as a response to the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s and 
helped set the stage for the financial crisis of 2007. 
More research is required to assess the impact of the governments’ current economic plans, 
not least due to the short time frame between the latest extensions of the housing scheme. 
Whilst this article cannot provide a definitive account of the coalition’s policies on housing or 
banking (or the coalition’s wider macroeconomic policies/management) evidence presented 
here suggests that the resolution of the previous crisis led to an unbalanced and unstable 
economy and if the policies of the 1980s are repeated on a macroeconomic scale then the 
mistakes of the 1980s may again repeat themselves. This article suggests that the responses to 
the financial crisis pose striking similarities to the crisis resolution of the 1980s, in particular 
policies of inflating the housing market is once again returning to the forefront of government 
policy. Such policies through creating and financing both a housing and consumer bubble laid 
the foundations for the financial crash of 2007. The same growth model that caused the crisis 
in 2007 has not been radically altered; instead the coalition government seems content to re-
impose much of the flawed economics, such as the reliance on property bubbles and capital 
and the owners of capital to create and sustain economic growth. 
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Figure 1 Housing equity withdrawl as a proportion of post-tax income Source (Office for National Statistics, 2009, 88) 
 
[Figure 2 Household debt as a proportion of household income. 1 Includes secured and unsecured debt. Source 

























































































Wealth of highest earners in Britain 1970-
1989* 
Top 10% income share-
married couples & single
adults
Top 5% income share-married
couples & single adults
Top 1% income share-married
couples & single adults
Top 0.5% income share-
married couples & single
adults
Top 0.1% income share-











Fig 6 Average House Prices 1= nominal house prices, not seasonally adjusted. 2= House prices adjusted for inflation 



















































































Average House Prices 1975-2013 
House Price (1)
'Real' House Price (2)
